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Abstract  
In this article, I track the deployment of rights in the vernacular across different subaltern 
citizen mobilizations in Southern Asia. In order to conceptually capture the ethical 
dynamism, ideational energy and intellectual innovativeness of this language of rights, I 
argue that we need yet more complex and different kinds of thinking. I propose the 
framework of vernacular rights cultures to theories and empirically document the rights 
politics in ‘most of the world’. A critical aspect of vernacular rights cultures, as a 
framework of analysis, is its attention to the languages—both literal and conceptual—of 
rights/human rights and also to the political imaginaries that these languages embody and 
make available. An important way of documenting and analyzing rights languages and 
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political imaginaries is to examine the justificatory premises that underpin the political 
struggles around claim making. In this article, I draw attention to three different 
justificatory premises that underpin the deployment of rights within contemporary 
subaltern rights struggles rights in India and Pakistan. By attending to the justificatory 
premises that animate and activate rights in the region, I am insisting not only on a 
scrupulous politics of location but also a refusal of orginary discourses that dominate 
human rights politics thinking and politics. 
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On Vernacular Rights Cultures and the Political Imaginaries of Haq  
 
 
Around the globe, one is witnessing multitudinous struggles over rights. Several of these 
are collective struggles by marginal and dispossessed groups over what Walter Mignolo 
has termed ‘life rights’ (2014), with some resisting precarity and dispossession heralded 
in by neoliberal developmentalism and its championing of privatization of natural 
resources: mountains, minerals, forests, rivers and streams; while others are struggling to 
redefine the substantive content of existing formal constitutional guarantees. The key 
question this paper asks is: How do we conceptually capture these rights struggles? In 
South Asia, and particularly in India, many of these rights struggles have not been without 
policy and legislative successes and several pioneering and innovative legislative acts are 
now in place guaranteeing citizen entitlements to information, food, and employment and 
land rights, and there now exists a growing and sophisticated scholarship analyzing the 
functioning, shortfalls as well as the impact of these newly introduced acts and policy 
measures (Dreze 2004; Shah 2007; Khera 2008, 2011; Bannerjee and Saha 2010). Within 
this burgeoning scholarship and more generally, however, there is less attention paid to 
the conceptual and epistemic languages of rights underpinning these struggles by 
marginal groups or of the nature of subjectivities and subjection these mobilizations 
engender, or indeed to the forms of rights politics these generate. To put it more 
specifically, we are yet to know of the justificatory premises of rights that informs and 
activates demands for expanded entitlements, or of the nature of rights languages 
underpinning ‘self making’ exercises mobilized in becoming a subject of formal rights, or 
of the traversal of rights and human rights, or indeed of the ways by which statecraft, 
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governmentalities and the market intersect and facilitate the dissemination of particular 
rights subjectivities. In short, we know altogether very little of how the rights languages 
are constituted and articulated by marginal subjects. In this article, I shall argue not only 
that these questions spearhead the study of the emergence and operation of rights cultures 
in marginal contexts in ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004), but also that their study 
requires a different conceptual lens - one that is able to capture their dynamism but also 
their difference - and one, which I shall term vernacular rights cultures. Viewing rights 
politics through the framework of vernacular rights cultures offers a lens through which 
the complexity and dynamism of rights-based mobilisations might be analytically 
captured, not simply as ones engaged in the translation and enacting of ‘global human 
rights’, but as those which have their own languages of rights and entitlements grounded 
in specific political imaginaries, justificatory premises and subjectivities. In short, 
vernacular rights cultures generate both a distinct set of rights and distinct practices 
through which rights are delivered, but also transform the rights that are inscribed in 
constitutions and political imaginaries.  
 
My aim in this article is threefold: To briefly introduce the framework of vernacular rights 
cultures, to document the literal and conceptual languages of rights that animate 
contemporary citizen mobilizations in Southern Asia, and to draw attention to the political 
imaginaries, subjectivities, and claims for subject status that underpin the latter. The 
predominant word signifying a right in South Asia is the Urdu/Arabic Urdu literal term 
haq and in this article, I will focus on the justificatory premises that underpin the 
deployment of haq within grassroots citizen struggles in the region. Here, I will bring 
“notes from the field" into conversation with three existing literatures: an ethnographic 
scholarship on haq on the one hand and on the other, anthropological research on and  the 
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political theory of a "global" phenomena called human rights. The vernacular rights 
cultures I shall describe are essentially those of subaltern groups; groups who are not in 
Spivakian terms ‘outside all lines of social mobility’ but who are in fact, actively involved 
in the struggle for expanding the terms of their representation through taking up rights 
discourses. I draw on my rights ethnographies of grassroots groups in Rajasthan 
mobilizing under the umbrella network of the ‘right to food’ movement in India and of 
Punjabi peasants demanding land rights in Pakistan in order to offer an analysis of the 
rights language that underpins vernacular rights cultures.  
 
A short note on vernacular rights cultures and on haq 
 
In a capsule form, the study of vernacular rights cultures is the study of the forms that 
rights politics takes in the ‘most of the world’ and of the ways it disrupts hegemonic 
human rights talk. It insists on the specificity of rights talk and on a multiperspectival and 
critical politics of location. It attends not only to the distinct spatio-temporal histories and 
languages of claim making, but also to the transformations, enablements as well as the 
limits to claim making in the neoliberal present. It tracks the distinct trajectories, 
formulations and intersections of languages of rights and human rights in marginal 
contexts and in so doing disrupts overarching narratives of epistemic progress, linearity, 
historical continuity or their radical separateness that underpin contemporary discussions 
of human rights. As a conceptual intervention, the lens of vernacular rights cultures 
sidesteps the theoretical foreclosures and binary deadlock of mainstream discussions on 
human rights to argue that vernacular rights cultures are not wholly derivative from or 
entirely oppositional to western notions and conventions of human rights or indeed, 
entirely discrete in form, in that one would be hard pressed to find hermetically sealed or 
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‘pure’ indigenous rights traditions but they are instead, interlocked into relations that are 
historically productively, intimately, and coercively produced and experienced. In 
exploring the different sites where formulation, translation and transposition of rights 
takes place, it is a key intervention aimed at tracking not only the etymological histories 
of the literal language of rights outside of the western world but also for focusing on the 
particular forms of conceptual development in rights/human rights resulting from the 
colonial encounter and anti colonial nationalism, the setting up of the postcolonial state 
and its distinct forms of developmentalism and bureaucratization and more recently, 
through the impact of the increased ‘destatization’ and the proliferation of the non state 
organizations advocating ‘human rights’. Finally, the term ‘vernacular’ here is strategic: it 
crucially flags up the fact that the exercise of ethical political agency accompanying 
demands for rights and entitlements is not only always sovereign, individualist, discrete or 
indeed privately articulated one but that it is predominantly expressed collectively and in 
religious, gendered and caste terms, and even as this demand for expanded entitlements in 
the vernacular arises out of the failure of democratic representative politics and state 
developmentalism or indeed draws support from international rights covenants, the nation 
state continues to be the principal addressee of these rights claims. 
 
A critical aspect of vernacular rights cultures, as a framework of analysis is an attention to 
the languages—both literal and conceptual—of rights/human rights and also to the 
political imaginaries that these languages make available. An important way of 
documenting and analyzing rights languages and political imaginaries is to examine the 
justificatory premises that underpin the political struggles around claim making. Since 
1999, I have been tracking the etymological roots, conceptual travel and contemporary 
deployment of the Urdu/Arabic word haq in grassroots people’s movements in India and 
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Pakistan. Haq or Hukk appears in Hindustani/Urdu lexicon through the influence of 
Persian in the subcontinent where it cuts across geographical, religious and linguistic 
boundaries to become the principal word deployed to make a right claim in Northern 
India and Pakistan.  
 
Remarkably cosmopolitan and with an extensive hinterland, haq is the predominant word 
used to signify a right in South Asia, Middle East and North Africa. A pre-Islamic term 
also available in the older Semitic languages, haq’s roots are said to lie in the classical 
Hebrew term hkk
2
 and its earliest use in Arabic can be traced to pre Islamic poetry where 
it means ‘something right, true, just or “proper” and real’. In the Qur’an, its fundamental 
meaning is ‘established fact’, ‘reality’, ‘justice and that which is true’ (Encyclopedia of 
Islam, 1971:82) and these meanings are also upheld in modern Arabic and Persian 
dictionaries (Mashkur 1978). It also means ‘the divine’ and as al-Haqq, it is one of the 
names for God (Smith 1971, Rosen 1981). In early dictionaries of the Hindustani 
language haq is translated as ‘right’, ‘due’ (Gilchrist, 1790),  ‘equity’ and ‘reason’  
(1773), but later dictionaries record a much more expansive meaning of the term  
describing it as ‘just, proper, right, true, correct, rectitude, right, title, privilege, claim, lot, 
portion, truth, true and God’ (Platts 1884). It follows therefore, that the constellation of 
normative, ethical, moral, empirical, ontological and divine meanings that attach to haq, 
effectively signify, that haq in fact, embodies particular imaginaries and discourses on 
ways of being. 
 
The complex and capacious imaginaries of haq are explored in anthropological writings 
on Islamic juristical languages and life worlds in different locations especially on matters 
of legal adjudications and disputations. Clifford Geertz in his ‘Local Knowledge’ (1983) 
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explores fact finding and rule applying in ‘adjudicative processes’ in different juridical 
traditions, namely the Islamic, the Indic and the Malayo-Indonesian and examines the 
ways in which different juristical life worlds deal with a central juridical problem: that 
between ‘the is/ought, what-happened/was-it-lawful distinction’ or that between fact and 
law. Contending that law is but one way of ‘imagining the real’ (184), Geertz writes that 
haqq, which he identifies as a key Arabic jurisprudential term, captures not only a 
‘distinctive way of imagining the real’ but also whose capacious meaning bridges the fact-
law divide characteristic of Western legal practices, invoking as it does a ‘deeper 
connection’ between the ‘normative and the ontological’3 or the ‘right and the real’ (189). 
He uses illustrations from everyday Moroccan usage to illustrate the moral, normative, 
ontological, juridical and religious connotations of haqq and identifies different ways in 
which haq is applied, and where each ‘level of application’—religious, metaphysical, 
normative/moral and a jural/enforceable claim-- reveals a consistent ‘identity between the 
right and the real’ (189) or that between the empirical and the normative.  
 
Lawrence Rosen (1981) also notes the normative and the ontological connections of haq 
in his ethnographic investigations of qadi justice in a qadi court
4
 in the Moroccan city of 
Sefrou where he observes the role and application of haq in legal adjudications. Through 
his ethnography, Rosen examines the influence of ‘cultural assumptions’ in shaping 
‘judge’s modes of reasoning, factual assessments, and choice of remedies’ (217) to argue 
that not only law (including in North America) is ‘suffused by culture and cultural is 
integral to law…’(218) but also that law is a critical site for negotiating questions of 
equity and discretion. In the qadi courts at Sefrou, questions of equity and discretion 
invariably involve adjudicating over the operation and validation of haqq. Rosen writes 
that Moroccan society is constructed around ‘a series of interpersonal ties, freely 
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negotiated and highly expedient which center on each individual every relationship 
implies an obligation…it is however, clearly understood that every action one takes 
creates an obligation in the other, and the key to the formation of network of personal 
ties… this sense of mutual ingratiation and indebtedness is broadly subsumed by 
Moroccans under the central Arabic concept of haqq” (221). To speak of haqq is, to 
convey that sense of mutual obligations that bind men to men, and man to God. Each of 
these obligations is open to negotiation and the question of whose obligation or haqq is 
valid,  “true” or “real” (223) needs to be settled. And it is in the qadi courts that the legal 
validation of haqq is established. 
 
Cutting across southwest from Morocco and to another Islamic legal context on the 
African continent, Susan F. Hirsch (1998) examines the discursive and dynamic 
constructions of gendered subjectivities and positionings in legal interactive speech over 
marital disputations in Kadhi courts in coastal Kenya. Unlike Rosen (1981), Hirsch’s 
focus is less on Kadhi negotiations of equity and discretion, than on the discourses 
available for ‘marital disputing’. A predominant literal and conceptual language of marital 
disputing in Hirsch’s ethnography is that of haki, the Swahili version of haq deployed by 
the disputants in Hirsch’s ethnography. According to Hirsch, ‘when disputants use haki, 
they produce distinct senses of the term that presuppose identifiably different 
discourses—one of specific, actionable laws and one of ethics or just behavior’ … and 
although, ‘ in the abstract, haki can embody haqq in all three senses’ identified by Geertz: 
of real, reality and God, with ethics and just behaviour and with law and justice, ‘but in 
Swahili marital disputes, most deployments of haki tend either towards rights or 
justice…’ (86). 
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These ethnographic deployments of haq in the different Islamic contexts explore Islamic 
jurisprudential traditions where haq operates as an ‘orienting’ (Geertz 1983:187) concept 
of Islamic law and theology. My ethnographic tracking on haq in the subcontinent, on the 
other hand, reveals that the use of haq is not limited to Muslim communities in the region 
nor indeed to only contexts of the application and adjudication of Muslim Personal Law, 
which incidentally, governs Muslim communities in both India and Pakistan
5
. In fact, a 
striking aspect of its deployment in the region is its use across geographical, linguistic and 
religious groups. For instance, in Rajasthan, where I have been conducting fieldwork 
since 1999, recent census figures suggest that Muslims constitute just 9.07% of the state’s 
population and Urdu (usually, associated with Muslim communities in the subcontinent) 
as only ever spoken by 1.17% of the people.
6
 In short, my point is that the use of haq in 
the region is not confined to Islamic jurisprudentialism but has a wider presence that 
includes claim making and seeking expanded citizenship entitlements from the state and 
its secular legal framework not always in alignment with Islamic juristical settlements of 
haq.  
 
In what follows, I shall identify three justificatory premises of haq and its ‘applications’ 
within contemporary struggles for rights in India and Pakistan that produce vernacular 
rights cultures by filtering, mediating and interpreting rights through particular political 
imaginaries. By political imaginaries of haq, I refer to a set of dynamic gendered 
relations, ideas, practices, discourses, institutions and subjectivities, which attach to haq 
and in turn, those which it mediates, justifies, accords meaning to and upholds. By the 
plural imaginaries
7
, I am referring not to a single but to a multiplicity of mediations of 
haq, each produced within particular political contexts of struggle, and in line with the 
insights of Geertz, Rosen and Hirsch, stipulating a ‘sense of how things usually go 
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…interwoven with…how they ought to go’ (Taylor 2002:106). Thus, haq orients proper 
ordering of relations among persons, contains within it an image of a gendered moral 
order and mediates citizenship, political discourse and political struggles. 
 
In India, my fieldwork has over the years spread to six districts of Rajasthan
8
 and has 
consisted mainly of recording narratives of development workers, grassroots political 
workers and participants of various citizen movements organizing under the umbrella of 
‘the right to food’ movement. In Pakistan, I have documented the deployment of haq by 
the Anjuman Mazarain demanding land rights in the Punjab. There are at least five 
significant things to note about the contemporary applications of rights language or haq 
that I shall document: firstly, the deployment of a right is not through a neologism but 
within the vernacular and as ‘haq’, and rights articulations do not occur as singular or 
even odd prototypes but draw upon and are negotiated through existing moral 
vocabularies and political grammar of norms, law, rules, entitlements, rights and 
identities. Secondly, vernacular rights cultures signal the overlapping and intersecting 
nature of the languages of rights and those of human rights, rather than insisting on either 
historical continuity or separation. In so doing, they resist theoretical foreclosure by 
sidestepping the paradox, that between the rights of man and of the citizen that 
characterizes much of the human rights debates in the Anglo-European world, in fact, if 
anything, these show that rights of man and of citizen are co-dependent, struggled for and 
intricately interwoven rather than paradoxical. Thirdly, these rights cultures are co-
produced through and invoked within multiple and diverse encounters with 
developmentalism, statism, legal constitutionalism and activism and therefore, it is at the 
intersection of these, and not as some freestanding abstraction that haq as a contemporary 
idea operates. In fact, as the ethnographic descriptions demonstrate, these intersections are 
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integral to the formation of vernacular rights cultures. Fourthly, despite the extensive 
deployment of haq within citizen mobilizations, individual rights regulate neither 
interpersonal relations nor social life in either India or Pakistan. And, finally, demands for 
gender equality or haq for women is a question that almost invariably needs to be begged 
separately and seldom occurs organically within citizen mobilizations, a limitation 
perhaps, of the factual-normative structure of haq, which doesn’t quite allow its easy 
translation into all demands for equality and rights. However, it is the case that demands 
of haq for women are not only voiced but also their enunciation brings into sharp relief 
not only the indivisibility and the intersectional nature of rights including imbrication of 
individual with collective rights but also their inherently conflictual nature. For instance, 
demanding the ‘right to information’ from elected representatives or indeed public 
officials about public programmes of health, education or employment in many cases 
involved a simultaneous claim for gender and caste equality whilst in the same breath 
drew attention to corruption rife in the local state bureaucracy and judiciary and to the 
flouting of procedural norms within the administrative, executive and legislative system 
itself. Perhaps, it is the indivisible nature of rights - of political and civic entitlements 
intersecting and interwoven with individual rights - that makes rights politics so 
conflictual.  
 
Haq as a positive legal right of Citizenship  
 
In India and Pakistan, several strands of rights discourses circulate of which three 
prominent ones are legal constitutionalism, developmentalism, and religious/ethnic 
nationalism, the latter expressed more in the language of freedom and autonomy from the 
nation state than of citizen rights per se. Although ‘divergent’ (Oldenburg 2010) in their 
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experience of democracy and representative government and citizenship, both countries 
guarantee fundamental rights to citizens
9
, albeit, with qualifications
10
 and with varying 
degrees of success and coverage. Both have superior judiciaries who’ve been less reticent 
in referencing and upholding international human rights law
11
, and while judicial activism 
is a recent phenomenon in the case of Pakistan (Newberg 2012,Waseem 2012, Shah 2014, 
Jaffrelot 2015), the Indian Supreme Court in the post emergency era has wrought a 
reputation for itself as a ‘torchbearer of human rights’ (Balakrishnan 2007:157) even if 
‘its impact on the ground is not consistent’12. Moreover, both India and Pakistan have a 
visible and vibrant women’s movement (Shaheed 2010, Madhok 2010) and an active 
institutional discourse on gender equality (Basu 2005). Finally, discourses of development 
and human rights have a discernable presence on both sides of the border, particularly in 
the NGO sector (Jaffrelot 2015). In short, therefore, what I am essentially saying is this: 
the three justificatory premises of rights/haq that I document in this paper, and which span 
India and Pakistan, occur not in some conceptual bubble but are articulated and negotiated 
in contexts of sustained encounters and interactions with developmentalism, 
colonial/postcolonial law, militarism, statism and constitutionalism. By 
developmentalism, a term I prefer to development, I refer to not only a set of institutions, 
discourses and practices but also to a ‘condition’ or a way of being’. This 
developmentalism is normative in its aims and includes both state and non-state actors; it 
speaks the language of self-empowerment and individual rights and has the 
transformation of subjectivities as its explicit aim; it also mediates the experience and 
knowledge of constitutional settlement on citizenship (Madhok 2013). In India, social 
movements are a variegated lot comprising ‘identity’ and ‘interest’ groups who more 
often than not practice a ‘dual level activism’; of engaging the government in order to 
influence public policy while also challenging societal norms and practices (Katzenstein 
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et al 2002, 267). Although, some social movements see the state as the main oppressor 
others participate in a much more ‘situationally developed politics’ (247) directing their 
campaigns at the judiciary for legal and policy reforms and for redressing injustices meted 
out by the state.  An example of the latter is the ‘Right to Food’ network in India, itself 
imbricated within non-state developmentalism and formed in 2001 as an umbrella group 
by several NGOs predominantly based in Rajasthan in order to frame a people’s response 
in the wake of the state government’s apathy and inaction in the wake of successive 
droughts, a time which ironically also coincided with a surfeit of official stocks of food 
grain. The growing hunger and destitution across rural areas of the state prompted the 
Rajasthan branch of the People’s Union for Civil liberties to submit “a writ petition 
accepted as a Public Interest Litigation or PIL (a form of judge led or  ‘juridical 
democracy’ that became operational in India in the post emergency period for ‘activating’ 
fundamental rights and providing protection from ‘excesses of state power’, Baxi, 1985) 
to the Indian Supreme Court on April 2001, questioning whether the “right of life 
guaranteed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution also included the right to food” 
(Banik, 2010, 265). In its response, the Supreme Court passed interim orders for the 
country wide implementation of the ‘mid-day meals’ scheme13 under which a cooked 
meal would be provided to all children attending government aided schools. In addition to 
pursuing legal strategies, the right to food network also organized community action 
through setting up village level akal sangharsh samiti (ASS) or ‘drought action 
committees’ to scrutinize aspects of drought relief assistance and governance procedures 
and to mobilize popular support in favour of a federal law guaranteeing the right to food. 
In March 2013, the Indian cabinet approved the ‘food security act’, a scheme looking to 
provide subsidized nutrition to two thirds of the Indian population at an annual cost of 1.3 
Trillian Rupees. Although the legislation suffers from several shortfalls, nevertheless, in 
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light of increased destatization and prevailing neoliberal inspired economic orthodoxies 
prescribing one size fits all models of self sufficiency, autonomy and entrepreneurial 
citizenship, it is indeed remarkable that this citizen activism has resulted in expanding the 
rights dispensation of the postcolonial state to secure for its most vulnerable citizens what 
is by all accounts, an ‘old fashioned’ social welfarist legislation. 
 
In the narratives of the grassroots participants of the right to food movement, by far the 
most ubiquitous justificatory premise underpinning rights claims or haq was that rights 
accrued to one through citizenship. Perhaps, this is not entirely unsurprising given the 
institutional focus of the movement
14
. In effect, one can detect two different but related 
ideas of citizenship in the narratives of haq: the first is a discernably ‘active’ view of 
citizenship that regards rights as crucial for political participation and for exercising 
citizenship, while the second is a more or less straightforward legalist notion of 
citizenship that predicates rights upon legal constitutionalism. An unmistakably ‘active’ 
view of citizenship replete with notions of self-governance, accountability and 
responsibility is clearly enunciated by the political and field workers of the MKSS. The 
MKSS or the ‘Association for Workers and Farmers’, also a part of the right to food 
network, has been involved in a long drawn struggle for the right of ordinary citizens to 
gain access to state financial records and to state audits of development projects. It 
spearheaded a social movement espousing the right of public information and of the 
people’s right to know about the government’s economic functioning, which led to the 
passage of a federal ‘Right to information Act’ in June 2005. The right to information 
(RTI) movement began in the early 1990s to highlight the gross failures of the state to 
uphold minimum wage legislation particularly within drought relief programmes set up to 
provide stipulated employment to people in drought affected districts and to focus on the 
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flagrant inefficiencies and corrupt practices within the state public distribution system 
(PDS). The people’s right to public information was seen as a key political tool with 
which to scrutinize reasons for endemic rural poverty and as a means of enforcing 
democratic accountability and transparency. However, the activities of the MKSS have 
not been limited to exposing the everyday forms of official corruption and focusing on 
procedures of governmental accountability but have also come to expose the ‘multifaceted 
nature of corruption’ within the legal and political system (Goetz and Jenkins 1999) 
championing innovative social techniques of mobilization and public appraisal.  
 
The interview below is excerpted from a lengthy conversation with two prominent 
members of the MKSS. According to them: 
 
As citizens, we have haq over this road, the road is built with our money. It is 
‘our’ money because we pay income tax and we pay also tax on whatever we 
buy such as rice, dal and cooking oil. That is how the sarkar (the 
state/government) builds hospitals and schools. It builds these with ‘our’ 
money. The money that people think is sarkari or the building that is deemed 
to be sarkari, we say to them: it is not sarkari, it is ‘our’ building and it is 
‘our’ money. ‘Our’ democracy must be safeguarded for that will make our 
rights safe. ‘Our’ effort should be that the constitution continues to guarantee 
the rights of citizens.
15
 
 
 
In a different vein and what might appear at least initially a predominantly statist/legalist 
notion of citizenship, consider the following excerpted interview with Prem Bairwa, a 
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dalit
16
 woman member of the village council in her village of Kotkhawada, Jaipur district. 
In addition to her role as a member of the local village council, Prem Bairwa is affiliated 
to a large and well funded NGO
17
 that explicitly describes itself as a ‘facilitator in the 
development process’ 18 and is also closely associated with the National Campaign for 
Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), a national level advocacy organization in India.  
 
According to her: 
 
As a council member, I have a haq in the panchayat (village council) to get   
development done in the village. Do only men have the right to speak and 
conduct political business; are not women to enjoy these rights equally? It is a 
fight for my haq and a fight I have to fight myself. The government has given 
these rights to women; Indira Gandhi started the mahila raj of women. Before 
her, there were no women’s rights. In case the government changes ‘our’ 
rights then we have to fight the government. After all, it is ‘us’ who make the 
government. 
 
At the outset, these two views of citizenship appear to resonate with liberal citizenship 
(subjects with rights) and also with those of civic republicanism and its ideas of self-
governance, rights and public service. They also seem to uphold the ‘umbilical 
relationship’ (Moyn 2010) between rights and the state. Yet, all these would be quick 
conclusions for at least two reasons: firstly, liberal citizenship is based on a contractual 
arrangement between individuals and the state on the basis of negative liberty, and civic 
republicanism with its valorization of political participation takes homogenous political 
communities as self-evident. Neither liberal selfhood nor assumption of single axial 
 18 
political identities inform the justificatory premise of haq as citizenship, not least, since 
the rights subjectivities engaged by haq are not always individuated and also because 
citizenship’s common unitary identity fractures only too easily by the actual practice of 
rights and citizenship especially by marginal subjects. Secondly, although, while it would 
seem that these deployments of haq conflate legal rights with entitlements, a widespread 
academic tendency that cuts across disciplinary divides
19
, where rights and entitlements 
are mainly (and interchangeably) understood as positive legal rights attached to 
corresponding obligations, liabilities, addressees and duties. However, paying close 
attention to the narratives above shows that claims of haq exceed this predominant and 
legalist understanding of rights and entitlements. If anything, the deployments of haq in 
my ethnographies embrace legal rights but also draw attention to entitlements or to extra 
jural claims. Within analytical philosophy, the distinction between rights and entitlements 
is not only one between legal and moral rights but concerns the more general question of 
the structure of rights, the relationship between rights and obligations and the 
justifications of rights itself. Consequently, the relationship between rights, claims, and 
entitlements has engaged philosophical discussions and many philosophers make some 
careful and intricate distinctions between these (Hohfeld 1978, Feinberg 1970, 
McCloskey 1976, Nickel 2007, Raz 1986, Sen 1986, Wasserstrom 1964). While some 
view rights not as claims or powers (McCloskey 1976, 99) but rather as essentially 
“entitlements to do, have, enjoy or have done” and consequently, independent of a 
corresponding duty holder in place from who rights can be claimed against. Others 
however, envisage rights as ‘valid claims’ backed by mandatory positive legal sanctions 
with a corresponding duty holder and/ or addressee in place and/ or, where there might (as 
in the case of moral rights) a claim for recognition based on existing moral principles. 
Joel Feinberg (1970) who is most closely associated with the above view regards rights as 
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‘valid claims’ which are always ‘correlated with another’s duty’ (255) but he also makes 
allowances for a ‘manifesto’ sense of rights in some contexts, which are entitlements 
without corresponding duty holders in place. As is evident, the chief distinction between 
valid and manifesto claims is over where to place the burden of obligation but also that 
the relationship between rights and obligations or duties is more often than not 
overdetermined by the question of law: rights are judged ‘valid’ or ‘weak’ depending on 
their relation to law. In other words, where there is no strong link between the two, there 
is unlikely to be a right, at least in the strictest sense (Hohfeld 1978). The activist 
narratives in my ethnographies deploy haq to denote ‘valid claims’ in so far as they claim 
haq over clearly identified sets of legal obligations and a stipulated addressee, i.e. the 
state, but often, demanding haq is also to claim recognition for an altogether new or a 
different set of rights or for an expanded set of rights. So, for instance, the political 
activism of the right to food movement and of the MKSS for the right to public 
information were raised in the first instance as qualified versions of ‘manifesto’ demands 
which were subsequently successfully converted into ‘valid claims’ with the passage of 
federal laws on the same; these were qualified manifesto rights in the first instance, 
because unlike Feinberg’s (1970) definition of manifesto rights, these were directed 
towards a specified addressee, i.e. the state and were therefore not unspecified claims. 
While it follows here that deployments of haq certainly coincide with legal rights, albeit 
with certain qualifications, but what does this legal coincidence lead us to infer about the 
nature of the justification underpinning haq here? In other words, does haq only ever hold 
in the presence of legal rights? Or to put it another way, does haq depend on declared 
legal rights to sustain its meaning and authority? At first reading, the above narratives 
appear to uphold a correlative link between rights and legal constitutionalism, in the sense 
that haq or rights are premised upon, depend on and are justified by legal constitutional 
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citizenship. However, if were to examine how haq mediates citizenship in these narratives 
more carefully, we would find that haq doesn’t quite posit a symmetric and correlative 
relations between itself and the positivist legal order of the state. In fact, upon close 
inspection, one will note a peculiar conceptual insight and it is this: whether these 
narratives rest their justificatory premise of rights on law or the state or on the 
constitutional rights and obligations of citizens, they retain with the people the right to 
change both the law/government or the constitution, in the final instance, if these fail to 
uphold the rights of citizens. For instance, in advocating constant vigilance over the state 
on citizen rights, both Prem Bairwa and the MKSS activists align haq with legal 
constitutionalism but crucially also withhold its subsumption into the latter. In other 
words, although the justificatory premise of rights in the two narratives draw on 
law/constitution and on legal citizenship, in both cases, there is a clear enunciation that 
even though law/constitution is required to these rights, haq has an independent 
justificatory premise separate from the formal legal regime of rights and lies in what Brett 
(2003:98) has termed a “zone of non coincidence between individuals and the positive 
legal order of the state”. Haq, therefore, refers to and is thereby based on an ethical, 
normative, moral and an empirical idea, which exists independent of the law and has a 
moral authority of its own
20
. 
 
A Cosmological Justification for Haq 
 
I now turn to a justificatory premise for haq predominantly embedded in ideas of the 
‘ancestral’, the ‘historical’, the ‘prior’ and the cosmological. Importantly, and as before, 
this justification too is not articulated in a discrete or an ahistorical way but as before, 
emerges in particular political, institutional and historical contexts of developmentalism, 
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citizen activism and legal constitutionalism.  
 
In my ethnography, the ancestral or cosmological premise for rights is mainly articulated 
by the indigenous peoples’ activists who are part of a large umbrella movement for rights 
to forest land claimed as ancient and sacred, which in Southern Rajasthan is known as the 
Jungle Zameen Jan Andolan (JZJA)
21
. The Jungle Zameen Jan Andolan (JZJA) came into 
existence in 1995 and now covers seven southern districts of Rajasthan. It was formed as 
a response to the forcible evictions of Rajasthan’s aboriginal communities or adivasis 
from their lands and traditional homes deep within the forests. India is not a signatory to 
the ILO Convention 169 on the rights of the indigenous peoples but it does provide 
special constitutional safeguards for indigenous peoples or the Scheduled Tribes
22
. The 
history of forest dispossessions however, predates the postcolonial state and is more than 
a century old (Guha 1989). It became systematized with the enactment of the Indian 
Forest Act in 1865 by the colonial state and its subsequent amendments in 1878 and 1927, 
which reserved a fifth of land area as ‘government forest’ primarily for increasing revenue 
and for ‘marketable timber’ (Rangarajan and Shahabuddin 2006:368), resulting in the 
removal of forest communities from designated ‘government forests’. In postcolonial 
Rajasthan, the dispossession and eviction of aboriginal peoples from their land is a fallout 
of the passage of the Rajasthan Forest Act of 1953 that converted tribal forest rights into 
‘concessions’ and required aboriginal dwellers to show ‘proof’ in the form of 
documentary evidence in support of their land or dwelling rights over the forest land. In 
the absence of correct procedural documentation, the land belonging to the adivasis was 
suddenly transferred to the state forest department and they became known in official 
speak as ‘tribal tillers’ and thereby ‘encroachers’ upon forestland. Over the years, the state 
government has sought to address the conditions of ‘tribal tillers’ by ensuing notifications 
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in 1978 and 1991 to regularise forest land possession, but these governmental circulars 
were not publicized among the beneficiary populations and even less implemented. In 
2002, the arbitrary, violent and coercive evictions of the aboriginal forest communities 
and other non-tribal forest dwellers from their homes and lands were carried out at scale 
‘unprecedented in recent history’23. In October 2006, as a direct outcome of a nation wide 
displaced forest dwellers campaign, the federal Parliament passed legislation decreeing a 
bill of rights of forest tribes or the ‘Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers (recognition of Forest Rights) Act to address the ‘historical injustices’ suffered 
by India’s forest communities. 
 
The Forest Act 2006 provides for individual rights and also collective community 
governance over forest land; in its implementation however, the act has preferred to deal 
with individual claims over forest land and paid “little attention to provisions to facilitate 
community control of state-owned forest areas” (Kumar and Kerr 2012: 758). In Southern 
Rajasthan, there are several locally based organizations affiliated to the JIZA that 
mobilize people on issues of collective governance over forest land and produce and also 
against state led eviction and violence on development projects inside forest land. One of 
these local groups is based in Kotra Block in Udaipur district and is known as the Kotra 
Adivasi Vikas Manch (Kotra Aboriginal Development Group), who are specifically 
concerned with the fallout from the ‘Phulwari Ki Naal’ wildlife sanctuary, which was 
declared as a sanctuary in 1983 and encompasses one hundred and thirty four villages in 
the area
24
. In the interview I represent below, one of my interviewees, Harmi Bai, a 
former secretary of the Adivasi Vikas Manch Kotra, and belonging to the Bhil tribe, 
describes the aboriginal peoples’ resistance to the declaration of the ‘Phulwari Ki Naal’ 
sanctuary and of the difficulties that this has caused. The designation of ‘Phulwari Ki 
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Naal’ as a sanctuary has led to a series of restrictions on people’s access to the forest and 
on their collection and consumption of forest produce such as honey, firewood, wood, 
fruits, medicinal herbs, tree bark and leaves, which the aboriginal villagers depend upon 
for their everyday survival. The ban also has a commercial sting: the villagers used to 
collect tendu leaves (local tobacco substitute) from the forest, made these into bundles 
and then sold them off to the contractors who came from the cities for manufacture as 
beedis. The sale of tendu leaves is a seasonal activity and even a two-week collection 
could earn a medium sized household cash in hand for the whole season
25
. The ban on 
forest produce have led to a substantial loss of earnings for aboriginal households with the 
result that a majority of these are now forced to undertake ‘seasonal migration’, mainly to 
work on the large landholdings in neighboring states as agricultural sharecroppers or 
laborers. In an excerpted conversation Harmi Bai reflects on some of these difficulties: 
 
 
         Earlier, we used to take the produce openly from the jungles and without 
any restriction and then suddenly, we were told that there was a 
prohibition on the forest produce as this was now a sanctuary for wild 
animals. We were told that we could not build homes or rear our 
animals or sow the field inside the jungle. We were told that this was 
now protected land and a sanctuary and that they were now going to 
develop a park inside it and that tourists were going to come from 
abroad to visit the sanctuary. .... 
          We continue to take the produce from the forests. We only take what 
we need. We are the owners of this jungle and the lands therein; we 
have a haq over these. Wherever there are adivasis there are jungles, in 
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the cities there are no jungles. We have protected the jungles. The haq 
over these forests and water comes from our ancestors. These are our 
sacred lands- our ancestral spirits reside here- we have ancestral rights 
over these lands. Our forefathers have used this land for centuries. We 
tell the state forest officials, you do your job and stay here and that 
together we can stop the jungle mafia who go into the jungles in their 
lorries illegally and for commercial purposes. But you cannot stop us 
from taking the produce for our own use from these jungles or force us 
off our land. 
 
Harmi Bai and her fellow activists of the Kotra Adivasi Vikas Manch spoke to me mostly 
in the Bhili/Bhilodi language making the presence of haq in their vocabulary, a word 
whose intellectual provenance and trajectory is vastly different from Bhili/Bhilodi, appear 
quite arresting. In the narratives of the Bhil activists, haq has very specific applications: It 
is hardly ever used to claim gender rights and equality and where it does, it draws on legal 
constitutionalism and not on prior entitlements. It is more often than not deployed to 
claim ‘qudrati haq’, or those rights justified by and/or in alignment with what nature or 
the cosmos intended. It is also used to signify ‘nazar qabza’ or community recognition, a 
possessive claim to untitled land and property not recognized in legal/state documents but 
one that is upheld by a council of community chiefs known as Bhanjgarhiya 
26
.  
 
Thus the deployments of haq encompass individual and collective claims but also legal, 
moral and cosmological ones. In demanding their haq to their forests, the Bhil aboriginal 
activists are staking a ‘valid or justified claim’ (Feinberg 1970) over ancestral forests 
lands - these claims are recognized under the ‘forest rights act, 2006’, which also 
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identifies the state as the obligation bearer - even though their justification of these rights 
claims is independent of the state and its constitutional legalism framed primarily around 
liberty and welfare. In deploying haq to invoke ancestral entitlements that are non 
derivative from the state but require the latter’s legal protection and implementation, the 
Bhil activists open up a discursive space that seeks an expanded rights dispensation from 
the state. In seeking ‘non derivative’ rights from the state, the Bhil activists underline the 
point that rights are not creations of the state or of the government but that they are 
‘dynamic’ (Gewirth 2001:332) and have independent justifications. Let me make two 
further remarks about the distinctions between the discursive deployments of haq in the 
above narrative and the category of a positive legal right in Anglo-American rights 
theorizing. Unlike the moral individualism espoused by several dominant rights theories, 
haq is not the moral property of self-regarding individuals and thereby, does not only 
engage in establishing jural “correlatives” and “opposites (Hohfeld, 1978) between ‘pairs 
of individuals’ (Simmonds, 142), i.e. in establishing what rights individuals have in 
relation to others and to which the latter are obligated. Propelling the analytical debate on 
rights is the existence of ‘dichotomies’, not least between abstract freedom and the 
context of choice or the one between individual autonomy and the public good 
(Simmonds, 129) However, the deployment of haq doesn’t suggest or uphold 
dichotomous relationships between individuals and the public good, rather, it signifies a 
cosmic inseparability and indivisibility of individuals from the collective good. And 
secondly, even if rights theorists do not premise rights on a commitment to individualism 
or when they refuse a rights based morality, they continue to insist that rights provide 
grounds ‘for action in the interest of other beings’. In other words, rights are envisaged to 
serve interests only of individuals as human beings whether as individuals or in 
collectives; rights whether individual or collective have to be ‘consistent with humanism’ 
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(Raz 1986, 208).  Therein lies the rub. Neither humanism or moral sovereignty of the 
individual or their interests, whether collective or individual, provide the justification for 
the haq claimed by the Bhil activists over their ancestral forests and against their 
dispossession. In their narratives, haq operates to uphold a cosmological and a normative 
order with its prescribed set of ethical relations and responsibilities, which include duties 
to (protect) nature
27
. It has a normative, non-humanist,  cosmic-ontological quality and its 
normative and ethical remit extends beyond self regarding individuals and their acts of 
claim making to invoke a social and political imaginary of living in the world alongside 
other species beings. 
 
Now, although, Harmi Bai and her group along with the IJZA have been unsuccessful in 
their bid to get the sanctuary notification quashed in the courts, they have been able to use 
the rights under the forest rights act especially those empowering elected village councils 
to decide on the use of forest lands for ‘non-forestry’ purposes and for ‘mega industrial 
projects’ to stop the relocation of four villages to facilitate progress of the Phulwari Ki 
Naal sanctuary
28
. The act has clearly released democratic energies and strengthened gram 
sabhas (village assemblies), which have organized popular refusals of large capital take 
over in the name of development such as by the global mining giant Vedanta Aluminum 
(Jena 2013) while also leading to increased coercion and state violence on aboriginal 
communities withholding consent to these.  In the face of increasing resistance on the 
ground and mounting pressure by international capital, on 28 October, 2014, the Ministry 
of Environment and Forests issued a directive which ‘exempts’ any land use proposal for 
industrial purposes from the requirement of seeking the consent of the gram sabhas, 
thereby bringing the democratic gains of the forest act under severe erasure
29
.  
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An Islamic justification of Haq 
 
Tracking haq further northwest and into Pakistan, the mobilizations of the Anjuman 
Mazarain (Peasants association of Punjab) in rural Punjab demanding the restoration of 
their ownership and sharecropping rights to the land taken over by the Pakistani military 
provide us with yet another insight into the specific political imaginaries which produce 
particular vernacular rights cultures. The struggles of the Mazarain must be seen in the 
context of the dominance of military in Pakistan which is also among the largest 
landowners in Pakistan; a position it has achieved through organizing ‘land transfers’ to 
itself and the wider ‘military fraternity’, not by illegal or extra-institutional means but 
through legal and institutional manipulations with some aid from systematic acts of state 
violence (Siddiqa 2007). Recent scholarship on Pakistan has documented the nature and 
extent of the military’s ‘economic predatoriness’ (Siddiqa 2007:5, Khan et al 2014) and 
traced its roots to the ‘unique colonial social contract’ (Khan et al 2014) that produced 
loyal colonial subjects through operating land distribution/transfers; a mode of patronage 
that the military in Pakistan has carried over into the postcolonial state with great 
effectivity. In fact, a striking commonality in the struggles of both the JIZA and the 
Anjuman Mazarain is that they both bring into sharp relief the continuing colonial 
haunting of legal arrangements and the social and economic arrangements these instituted. 
In the case of Pakistan, the carry over of colonial legal arrangements has helped forge 
together a postcolonial ‘state-society consensus’ based on the ‘guardianship of the 
military’ (Khan et al 2014). For not only do these ‘land transfers’ to the Pakistani military 
owe their legal and institutional legitimacy to various colonial era laws such as the ‘Land 
Acquisition Act of 1894’ and ‘The Colonization of Land Act 1912’ (later updated by the 
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Government of Pakistan in 1965), but also the management of these lands by the military 
in postcolonial Pakistan is based on ‘Cantonment Land Administration Rules 1937’ used 
by the colonial military (Siddiqa 2007: 177). Yet, it is also the case that it is over the 
question of land that the ‘state-society consensus’ in Pakistan suffers its first ‘public 
fracture’ (Khan et al 2014) with the struggles of the peasant sharecroppers at Okara and 
Khanewal mounting a ‘resistance to the post-colonial state dominated by the army’ 
(Akhtar 2006).  
 
Essentially, the Anjuman Mazarain are demanding ownership over the land they’ve been 
tilling ever since the colonial transfers of population to people vast irrigation projects 
which began in 1885.  Under the 1894 ‘Land Acquisition Act’, the colonial state 
transferred populations to its newly built ‘canal colonies’ and irrigation projects 
promising to bequeath ownership rights to resettled populations over these lands. But this 
promise was never upheld, either in colonial period or by the postcolonial state. As a 
result, these peasants continued cultivating only on the basis of usufruct rights over the 
land and as sharecroppers rather than landowning peasants. Except for a short period 
between 1957-60, when ownership of some of this land was transferred to the Mazarain, 
an order that was subsequently rescinded, the peasant populations on these lands have 
more or less continued to till the land according to the sharecropping and tenancy rights 
established under the 1884 Act. In the early half of 2000, the military administrators of 
these farms introduced changes to the original terms of the contract and revised the basis 
of the prevailing peasant sharecropping arrangement concluded over a century ago, which 
regulated the share of the agricultural produce and occupancy rights.. The revised terms of 
the contract replaced sharecropping with its proportional division of crop yields to 
requiring cash rentals
30
. Fearing economic destitution and eviction, the peasant 
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sharecropper farmers organized themselves as the ‘Anjuman Mazarain’ adopting the 
slogan ‘maalki ya maut’ (‘ownership or death’) in order to oppose the new terms of the 
contract and, in so doing, openly challenged Pakistani military rule.   
 
On 7 October 2000, five thousand peasant farmers organized a peaceful protest against 
the new tenancy laws proposed by the military; two days later, armed police along with 
the Frontier Constabulary entered the village and started a campaign of violence against 
the village sharecroppers. Thus began four years of intimidation and siege of the Okara 
farms by the military leading to arbitrary imprisonments without trial, intimidations, 
beatings and fatalities. In the course of the agitation and in aftermath, various legal 
challenges were mounted by the Anjuman Mazarain against the Military in Pakistani 
courts which, in turn, placed the military ownership of the farm lands under legal scrutiny, 
thus making the very claim of ownership of these lands a legal and even a political 
question. The court proceedings established that the Pakistani military was, in fact, not in 
any legal position to introduce changes to the peasant contract and even less able to 
establish, through documentary evidence, its proprietary status as the landowner
31
. As a 
consequence of the legal pronouncements, the tenants of Okara and Khanewal military 
farms have not surrendered any share of their crop yields to the military, Pakistan’s most 
powerful institution and have continued to retain control over the land.  
 
Perhaps, not unsurprisingly given that activists of the Anjuman Mazarain belong 
predominantly to the religious and linguistic groups most identified with Urdu in the 
subcontinent, i.e. Muslims and native Urdu speakers, they also deploy the term haq to 
demand their land rights. The justificatory premise of their deployment of haq is neither 
cosmological nor tied to demands for citizenship, instead, it is embedded in and derives 
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its justification from Islamic jursiprudentialism and Qur’anic meanings and is 
consequently tied very strongly to the idea of ‘right conduct. However, not unlike the 
demands of the activist groups in Rajasthan that I described before, the Islamic premise 
deployed by the Mazzarein also exceeds the legal category of rights, and in contrast to the 
Islamic accounts of haq presented by Rosen, (1980) Hirsch (1998) and Geertz (1993), are 
claims against the state for the restitution of laws of ownership under secular legal 
arrangements and not against particular persons under Islamic personal law. The 
following narrative of an activist of the Anjuman Mazarain at Khanewal allows us to 
document haq that derives its mainstay from a popular Islamic understanding but one 
used outside of a strictly religious context and towards what might be seen as secular 
ends. 
 
This word (haq) comes from Islam because Islam clearly marks out a very 
clear definition of the practices and conduct that constitutive of right 
behaviour. Islam invokes haq in two separate ways: a) as Haqooq ul Allah 
which is to do with right conduct in the discharge of religious obligations such 
as offering prayers five times a day, fasting during Ramzan and fulfilling all 
those religious that make me a good Muslim and b) Haqooq – ul- abad which 
relates to right conduct in respect of other human beings including towards 
my government and my family... 
The right to cultivate and possess ownership is prescribed in the Holy Qur’an. 
For instance, in the Qur’an on paragraph 3, it says very clearly: if some one 
who cultivated the land for five years, he then becomes the owner of the land.  
Therefore, the Mazarain have a right over the land which is justified by Islam 
itself”32. 
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In this particular narrative, I am less interested in questions of ‘purity’ or the faithful 
recalling of the Qu’ranic passage and more in the marshaling of Qur’anic texts by peasant 
activists in their struggle for land rights. Furthermore, I am not suggesting that this 
narrative reflects a definitive version of Islamic haq but only that it is a notion of haq that 
traces its normative underpinnings to Islamic texts and to mystical Islam (Schimmel 
1975). However, as pointed out in the narrative, it is indeed correct that within Islamic 
scholarly heritage, the notion of haq is often evoked as right conduct. In Islamic texts for 
instance, haq or haqq is referred to as ‘right things’ and contrasted with batil or wrong 
things. “Haq is the doing of right things like the acts of obedience, the doing of which 
God has not forbidden” and batil or ‘wrong things’ is “associated with injustice, Kufr, and 
the acts of disobedience. Both are equally God’s creation. But the one is right and the 
other is wrong” (Isutzu 1965). This interpretation of something being morally right and or 
‘morally straight’ is quite distinct from having a right over something or possessing 
something. The ‘morally right’ sense of rights finds clear elucidation in early western 
political philosophical texts and consequently, the history of western political concepts is 
replete with an intense speculation as to when rights as we know today came to acquire 
their possessive meaning as opposed to their earlier meaning, which evoked ‘moral 
rectitude’. Very quickly, I want to add here that haq as ‘right conduct’ must not be viewed 
as a gender neutral term nor should its intellectual justification invoking Islamic heritage 
be regarded as ‘non political’33. Although, the Anjuman Mazarain protests has seen large 
mobilizations of women peasants, supported by a range of women’s rights activists, the 
question of gender equality has needed to be clearly begged separately and has not 
emerged organically as part of the demands made by the movement. And even if women’s 
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participation and demands for landownership rights alongside the male activists has 
‘indicated a shift (even if only in symbolic terms) in the existing thinking from 
community rights to women’s rights especially when due share in inheritance and 
property were until very recently not subjects of public debate’ (Mumtaz and Mumtaz 
2012:148), any consolidation of this ‘shift’, will require building up ‘long term linkages’ 
across the women’s movement in Pakistan (Shaheed 2010), including alliances of 
solidarity between peasant women in rural Pakistan and urban women activists 
campaigning for women’s rights in the cities of Lahore and Karachi.  
 
Vernacular Rights Cultures, Rights and Human Rights  
 
At this point, you might ask as to why should we frame these rights mobilizations and 
deployments of haq in terms of vernacular rights cultures and not simply as yet more 
growing evidence of the globalization and expansion of human rights?  For is it not now 
commonplace to argue that the last two hundred and fifty years have witnessed the ‘global 
diffusion of a culture of rights’ (Ignatieff 2001)? Or at times more warily, that human 
rights ‘have become the ‘most globalized values of our times’ (Wilson 1997)? While the 
celebrators and detractors of human rights link the causes of this spread of rights 
variously to the impact of western colonialism, immigration, international legal 
instruments and global communication, the originary assumption informing these 
arguments is an orientalist one: that the conceptual, philosophical and empirical 
experience of rights can be traced to the revolutions of the modern west and are in fact, a 
testament to the incontrovertible march of progress and civilization heralded by them.  In 
recent years, however, scholars have produced precise histories detailing the ‘invention’ 
of human rights (Hunt 2007) and to disrupt the originary impulse (Madhok 2015) to 
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aggregate a variety of ‘western’ rights talk in different historical periods with that of the 
international human rights one (Moyn 2010). They have written of the ‘indeterminacy’ 
and paradoxical nature of rights (McCann 2014; Merry 2014, Deakin 2014; Brown 2000) 
and pointed to the contradictory, alienating, exclusionary and politically conservative 
effects of a universalizing and homogenizing human rights politics (Asad 2000; Brown 
2000, 1995; Menon 2004; Crenshaw 2000; Spivak 2002). In many critical accounts, 
human rights are seen as constituting a ‘central’ element of US led globalization, 
capitalism and world trade (Mignolo 2000), and thereby, implicated and invested in 
upholding existing global power relations and hierarchies of representation. Characterized 
as a ‘global secular religion’ (Meister 2002), they are also critiqued as a form of 
‘transnational governmentality’ (Grewal 2005) and also as a form of ‘biopower’, (Cheah 
2013, 2014). Within recent human rights scholarship, one can discern at least two distinct 
strands of critical disciplinary based scholarship on human rights: the first which is 
mainly that of political philosophy/theory concerns itself mostly with the logics of 
equality, democracy and citizenship and in particular with the ‘right to have rights’ 
(Rancierre 1999; 2009; Balibar 2002; Agamben 1998; Cheah 2013, 2014; Douzinas and 
Gearty 2014) and the second, mainly anthropological work (Biehl 2013; Wilson 1997; 
Merry and Goodale 2006; Visweswaran 2010; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Cowen and 
Wilson 2001; Abu Lughod  2013; Povinelli 2011) has engaged thoughtfully on the limits 
of liberalism and legal constitutionalism in the post colony (Povinelli 2011, Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2012), on the ‘active life’ of rights (Abu Lughod 2010), of their 
‘vernacularization on the ground’ (Merry and Levitt 2009) and on  the intersection of  
biopolitical technologies, law and the market (Biehl 2013). While both sets of scholarly 
debates inform thinking on vernacular rights cultures they are by themselves insufficient 
and we require yet more complexity. For instance, recent debates on the relation between 
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rights and citizenship have focused on the ‘logic of equality’ (Rojas, 2013) or on acts of 
citizenship through which non-citizens seek the right to have rights that have already been 
declared (Ranciere 1999; Balibar 2002). However, paying attention to the production of 
vernacular rights cultures reveals that mobilizations of marginal and dispossessed groups 
does not just involve a logic of equality and inclusion through which dispossessed groups 
demand already existing rights. Rather, these mobilizations not only seek to alter the 
means through which rights are delivered (Dunford and Madhok 2015) but also to 
transform the content and meaning of the rights that are already in place while also 
demanding that new rights are brought into being, as the right to food movement and also 
those to forest lands described here make clear. And furthermore, although, the recent 
efforts to study ‘vernacularization on the ground’ (Merry 2006; 2009), where 
vernacularization refers to the ‘process of appropriation and local adoption of globally 
generated ideas and strategies of vernacularization’ (Merry and Levitt 2009: 441), is an 
important intervention into studying the ‘local uses of global women’s rights’ in different 
sites, ultimately though, it suffers from a significant conceptual difficulty: It operates 
within and actively reproduces the binaries of the epistemic - authorial global versus the 
non-epistemic--translating local, and thereby, forecloses agentival activity and authorship 
of rights from elsewhere and not least from the margins. A key component of 
vernacularization of human rights according to Merry and Levitt, (2009) is their 
‘translation’ which is done by a ‘chain’ of ‘vernacularizers’ from the global to the 
national and all the way to the local. While Levitt and Merry are careful to point out the 
differential power relations and vulnerabilities of vernacularizers that impact their 
effectiveness in different contexts and allow vernacularizers to ‘talk back’ to the ‘global 
values packages’, it is unclear from the examples they provide, how this ‘talking back’ 
displaces either the epistemic center of human rights which they identify as the ‘West’ 
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and from where they travel to other places and are vernacularized, or indeed their content 
or forms and modes of expression. In other words, vernacularization or indeed 
vernacularizers leave epistemic hierarchies intact. To think in terms of vernacular rights 
cultures, on the other hand, is to insist on a non-linear, historical and a transnational 
analysis of rights/human rights discourses without refusing the power dynamics in which 
these operate. As I have illustrated through the rights ethnographies in this paper, 
vernacular rights cultures inhabit particular political imaginaries and arise as movements 
make demands for rights that are inflected with the particular cultures, histories and 
contexts of political mobilisations. And although, they can be transnational in nature  -- in 
terms of shared legal and political histories, resonances and even active linkages with 
similar forms of oppression and related historical cultural contexts such as the newly 
developing links between the right to food movement in India and the via campensina in 
Latin America
34—they are rooted in an insistence that we don’t lose sight of the cultural, 
historical, linguistic and political specificity of rights claims and also of the political 
imaginaries these inhabit. Furthermore, while, I think it is important and interesting to 
track how ‘global rights’ transfer and ‘translate’ into different settings, it is but only one 
strand/aspect of rights activism and must be accompanied by analyses of how not only 
certain rights became global/universal but also how these in turn are undergoing 
expansion and change under pressure from collective struggles. In other words, we need 
to see rights and human rights activism beyond prisms of discrete agent based activism, 
even though individual agents play important roles in ‘transferring and translating’ rights, 
to examine the ways in which transnational principles, practices and imaginaries of rights 
are sutured with the multiple histories, imaginaries, subjectivities and contexts in which 
they are formed and reflect a history of struggles that is both local and transnational. To 
sum up, arguments here have been making this essential point that:  rather than suggesting 
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that a relatively unchanging, universal set of abstract principles or an authoritative set of 
rights are filled out with particular ‘localized’ content in diverse contexts, vernacular 
rights cultures suggest that transnational rights principles, imaginaries and practices are 
shaped and transformed through the diverse and multiple contexts in which rights are 
demanded and exercised.  
 
Conclusion: 
The movements for haq I am tracking in this paper are precariously positioned live 
struggles. The Anjuman Mazarain continue to protest in the face of heavy securitisation of 
their lands; the right to food movement is seeing its legislative gains eroded with the 
ruling right wing BJP led government threatening to cut back food security entitlements; 
and JIZA and India’s forest communities face the impending threat of a dilution of the 
forest act 2006 and increased state violence, coercion and dispossession in order to make 
way for easier land acquisition for private investment and also further restrictions on 
forest land through converting them into national parks. Even as I write this, news is 
rolling in of an ‘executive order’, the first of its kind, cancelling the rights of tribal 
communities under the ‘Forest Rights Act’ in order to ‘facilitate coal mining’ by a 
syndicate of transnational and national capital, in Eastern India
35
.   
 
To conclude then, the three different political imaginaries of haq that I document in this 
paper: constitutional/legal citizenship, entitlements of the prior and those based on Islam, 
are all produced, articulated and negotiated within live political contexts of struggle and 
precarity and provide insights into how vernacular rights cultures are mobilized. A focus 
on vernacular rights cultures I have argued enables a conceptual optic into the ‘active’ 
conceptual, empirical, epistemic and political life of rights and into the specific stakes and 
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struggles for rights in different locations while refusing straightforward originary and 
binary descriptions of these as either merely local variants of global rights talk or 
radically and incomprehensibly different.  
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2
 Its root in classical Hebrew is: “ (a) “to cut in, engrave,” in wood, stone or metal, (b) “to inscribe, write, 
portray”… (c) “to prescribe, fix by decree”, (d) “due to God or man, right privilege”…”  
(Encyclopedia of Islam p 82). 
3
 Geertz doesn’t explicate how he deploys ‘ontological’ and I’m reading him here as alluding to haq as 
consisting of a discourse on nature of being. See David Graeber (2015) on some of the ambiguities 
surrounding the use of the term in anthropology. 
4
 The jurisdiction of the qadi courts in Morocco are limited to matters pertaining to personal law governed 
by its 1958 Code of Personal Status and thereby, only to those of marriage, divorce, filiation, inheritance 
and child custody. 
5
 The Pakistan legal context is more complex with the setting up in 1980 of the Federal Shariah Court, 
which has the authority to determine ‘as to whether or not a certain provision of law is repugnant to the 
injunctions of Islam’ (Hussain, 2011:15). 
6
  Linguistic Survey of India, Rajasthan (Part 1), 2011.  Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. 
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-documents/lsi/lsi_Rajasthan/4_introduction.pdf  
Accessed 03 September 2015. For census data on Muslim population in Rajasthan, see 
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/C-01.html 
7
 I’m drawing on Taylor for whom social imaginaries are ‘ways people imagine …how they fit together 
with others, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that 
underlie these expectations' (23). 
8
 A British Academy Grant (SG-39747) made fieldwork in Rajasthan (2005-07) and research assistance in 
Okara and Khanewal in Pakistan between 2007-08 possible.  
9India’s constitution adopted in 1950 sets out Fundamental rights in Part III of the document, and while 
Pakistan’s constitutional history is more chequered having gone through three enacted constitutions but it 
too guarantees fundamental rights in Part II of the 1973 constitutional arrangement. 
10
 In the case of Pakistan, the establishment of Shariah federal courts qualifies the nature of remedies 
available to citizens. The operation of Muslim Personal Law in India similarly qualifies aspects of state civil 
law in relation to Muslims. 
11
 Pronouncing on gender equality, the Indian Supreme Court famously referenced CEDAW in Vishakha vs 
State of Rajasthan to lay down legal guidelines for the prevention sexual harassment of women in the 
workplace. (All India Reporter of the Supreme Court 1997:3011] More recently, the Delhi High Court in 
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Laxmi Mandal vs the Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital [W.P.C.C 8853/2008] drew on India’s commitments 
to various international rights protocols in order to pronounce a legal basis for the protection of reproductive 
rights of women. In Pakistan’s plural legal system, writes Shaheen Sardar Ali (2012, 22), ‘human rights 
treaties appear to be invoked by the judiciary as effortlessly as customary and Islamic norms as well as 
constitutional provisions of equality and non-discrimination’. 
12
 Rajagopal points out that this is due to the  “ideological character of the Court’s particular approach to 
human rights’ and its biases… in favor of the state and development, in favor of the rich and against 
workers, in favor of the urban middle-class and against rural farmers, and in favor of a globalitarian class 
and against the distributive ethos of the Indian Constitution” (2007:158). 
 
14
The movement has focused on legislation and schemes, including the national rural employment guarantee 
act, the integrated child development services, mid-day meals scheme, and the public distribution system. 
15
 Interview with Sarpanch Tej Singh and Sarpanch Narayan, Rajsamand, 2004. 
16
 Dalit refers to those belonging to formerly the untouchable castes. 
17
 Cecoedecon noted by many to be one of the largest recipients of foreign funds. Interview with Sunny 
Sebastian, Rajasthan correspondent for the ‘ The Hindu’, February 2004, Jaipur. 
18
 http://www.cecoedecon.org.in/orgprofile.html 
19
 For this conflation within legal theory, see (Hirschl 2000, Morris 1992); for occurrence in philosophy, see 
for instance, the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy; and inpolicy documents, see in particular UNRISD 
or indeed its various background papers on migration, gender equality. 
20
On haq’s particular quality of legal ‘non-coincidence’ as well as its moral authority, see Madhok (2013). 
21
For accounts of cosmic tales and traditions detailing aboriginal originating myths and status see Verrier 
Elwin (1937)  
22
 The terms ‘tribe’ and ‘tribal’ are not uncontested but they continue  to be used as ‘policy terms’ 
23
 See ‘Campaign for Survival and Dignity’ 2003. 
24
 The sanctuary covers a total area of 511.41 sq. km out of which 365.92 sq. km hectares are designated as 
‘Reserved Forest’. See Forest Department Rajasthan (2014).  
25
 Interview with Napi Bai, Medhi Panchayat, Kotra, 06 August 2015. 
26
 Interview with Dharamchand Kher, Rajasthan Adivasi Rights Organisation, 09 August, Udaipur 2015. 
27
 Interview with Rapli Bai, Medhi Panchayat, Kotara, Udaipur, 06 August 2015. 
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28
 Interview with Rapli Bai ( also known as Napi Bai), 2015. 
 
29
 http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-activist-up-against-fra-act-dilution-2030760.   
 
30
 Human Rights Watch (2004)  
31
 It emerged that the Pakistani Military at the time of gaining independence in 1947 had the lands 
transferred from the British Military to them, but had in effect, paid no rent to the Punjab Revenue 
Department which was the lessee of the land and hence, as a result of reneging on its contractual agreement 
with the Revenue department had very little legal authority to administer these agricultural farms in the first 
place.  
32
 Interview with Mustafa, Khanewal, Pakistan 2008. 
33
 For feminist interpretations of Islamic heritage and religious texts see Mernissi, 1991, and Ouedghiri 
2002. 
34
 Interview with Kavita Srivastava, General Secretary, People’s Union of Civil Liberties, Jaipur April 2015. 
35
 The tribal lands have been ‘allocated’ to a state enterprise, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited  
(RVUNL) and to Adani Minerals Private Limited. http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-
affairs/chhattisgarh-govt-cancels-tribal-rights-over-forest-lands-116021601327_1.html 
